



Down-Scaling Commercial Banks into MFIs

A Case Study from Kazakhstan

Taken From CGAP.ORG Case Study “Scaling Up Poverty
Reduction: Case Studies in Microfinance”

Consultative Group to Assist the Poor:
World Bank Financial Sector Network



Reasons for this Case

- Thus far, focus has been on growing smaller NGOs into MFIs – we should understand both sides.
 - In thinking about final deliverable, we may be considering case study.
 - Kazakhstan is particularly relevant considering recent current events.
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Background

- Kazakhstan Small Business Programme (henceforth known as “The KSBP”) is the second programme to try to “downscale” commercial banks as a means of delivering micro and small enterprise (MSE) loans.
 - It began in 1998 and serves as “the model” for introducing microfinance to commercial banks.
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Reasons for Formation

- Government tried to institute a failed credit line for small and medium enterprise loans.
 - Previous Program: SME credit line provided by EBDR and guaranteed by the Kazakh Government (1993).
 - By 1997, less than 1/3 of the guaranteed \$122.6 million had been disbursed.
 - Poor Portfolio Quality (One bank actually lost an entire \$9.7 million portfolio that forced the Govt to honor its guarantee)
 - It was established by EBDR (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) in response to the government's plea
 - Remaining funds taken out of the failed credit line to be devoted to this project.
 - Partnered with:
 - USAID
 - EU
 - Government of Kazakhstan
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Structure

- Modeled after the Russian Small Business Fund
 - KSBP teams up with “Partner Banks” to create independent MSE departments within each bank.
 - They have their own loan officers and financing sources, but they reach a broad audience by using infrastructure that is already developed.
 - Slow Growth Plan: Expansion (such as to new regions, poorer market segments, or other partner banks) was slow so that the program could rely on training and learning.
 - KSBP was also in a favorable macroeconomic environment...
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Macroeconomic Environment

- ❑ Stable macroeconomic environment (ie, no huge gains or losses – normal business cycle).
 - ❑ Government Political Support (reduces political risk which is a huge consideration when investing across borders)
 - ❑ Capitalistic Principles: The government supported KSBP from the beginning, but “resisted the temptation to intervene in the program.”
 - ❑ Liberalized financial market that was well regulated and supervised.
 - ❑ Strong competitive pressures on banks as the sector consolidated (=M&A? Not sure...)
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Structural Considerations

- Major Advantage to KSBP: Could learn from the past failures.
 - Understanding that the problem with the first program was a deficiency in supply side rather than lack of demand.
 - Partner Banks lacked the interest or know-how to issue SME loans. This was a structural fault of the old program.
 - Purpose of KSBP: Not only to provide funds, but to transfer know-how and **create incentives to build up a viable supply-side.**
 - Kazakh Government sponsored a “technical cooperation package.”
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Growth Phases

- Start Up Phase
 - Expansion Phase
 - Regional Expansion
 - Product Expansion
 - Adding New Banks
 - Institutionalization
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Start Up Phase

- Five Partner Banks who met strict eligibility requirements were selected.
 - Full Banking License
 - Approval by the NBK
 - IAS Audit
 - Program-Compatible Strategy
 - Committed Bank Management
 - Financial Stability
 - Strategic Geographic Location
 - Four of the banks were private, while one of them was public (it converted to become private in 2001).
 - Foreign experts were hired to train loan officers and run the local branches.
 - It started with eight branches in the two major cities, Almaty and Astana. The first products were micro-loans in both tenge and dollars.
 - Focus was on perfecting organizational structure of these banks: MIS Systems, developing MSE lending guidelines, incentive-based pay schemes for loan officers. The purpose was to establish **independent and specialized MSE loan departments**.
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First Expansion Phase (1999)

- Once the program was developed, KSBP expanded in two dimensions:
 - **Horizontally:** Building MSE departments in new banks and expanding into new cities.
 - By 1999: Reached 6 more cities.
 - **Vertically:** Training staff of other non-MSE departments within the banks and influencing the regulatory environment (collateral requirements)
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Second Expansion Phase (2000-2002)

- Regional Expansion
 - Focus on Urban MSE Market
 - MSE Departments set up in the Banks of all major cities. By 2002, there were 117 lending outlets.
 - Product Expansion
 - Moving Downmarket
 - The focus had previously been on micro/small business but not yet market traders who needed small “working capital” loans.
 - New Product: **“Express Micro Loan”**
 - **Easier Collateral Requirements (Moveable, Unregistered Assets)**
 - **Faster Disbursement (24 hours)**
 - **Special MSE Outlets**
 - Partner Bank Expansion
 - Within the partner banks, higher levels of management were created for microfinance to integrate these MSE departments higher into the organizational structure.
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Second Expansion Phase (2000-2002)

- **Expansion of Training and Monitoring**
 - Seminars, Consultant-Development,
 - By 2002: Banks were training their own microloan officers, investing their own funds into microfinance, and hiring KSBP staff to work in more senior positions (especially in risk management)
 - They reduced the number of foreign-hired “experts.”



Institutionalization (2003-2004)

- This was a very successful organization:
 - In all cities of Kazakhstan (100,000 population)
 - Intense Penetration in the Lower End of Market
 - Express loans accounted for 50% of the loan portfolio in 2004.
 - Partner Banks finance about 40% of the MSE business with their own resources and MSE products are regularly marketed.
 - Power over MSE Departments is moving from the KSBP to the banks themselves.
 - Focus is moving towards streamlining partner banks' operations, auditing, and advanced training of organically grown professionals.
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Impact Analysis

□ Defining Impact:

- In the case of a down-scaling operation, impact should be measured by more than just poverty reduction (= income and consumption increase).
- Really, should focus on “can this program build and maintain sustainable institutional structures after donors’ money is gone?”

□ KSBP’s Sustainability

- Not clear completely – lack of transparent financial data on a bank-by-bank basis.
 - PAR (Portfolio at Risk) is typically low at around 1%. Even during the Russian Financial Crisis in 1999, it was only about 4%.
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Impact Analysis

□ Reaching the Right Clients

- KSBP's Portfolio Growth was **not** a result of moving up-market and abandoning the original target group.
 - Average loan size decreased throughout program as the total loan portfolio increased. The median client had a loan of about \$2000 (still rather large).
 - Working Capital Loans accounted for almost 80% of the clients in 2004.
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Loans were focused down-market

Table 2: Distribution of Loans by Loan Amount (February 2004)

Loan Amount in US\$	Number	Percent	Volume	Percent
< 1000	6,904	19.59	3,039,038	1.87
1001-2000	9,959	28.26	10,191,287	6.26
2001-5000	9,543	27.08	21,941,387	13.49
5001-10000	4,346	12.33	24,495,695	15.06
10001-20000	2,384	6.77	27,404,825	16.84
20001-30000	933	2.65	18,686,632	11.49
30001-50000	652	1.85	20,831,178	12.80
50001-70000	199	0.56	9,370,367	5.76
70001-100000	194	0.55	13,232,331	8.13
> 100000	124	0.35	13,505,302	8.30
Total	35,238	100.00	162,698,041	100.00



Driving Factors

- Commitment to Political and Economic Change
 - Worked to change both legislation and economic structure.
 - Legislation: Changing the definition of collateral.
 - Interest rate ceilings had been abandoned, two-tier banking system, push towards privatization.
 - Economic: Mission focused on downmarket clients.
 - Institutional Innovation
 - Downscaling from Banks rather than Upscaling from NGOs
 - Performance Based Incentives
 - Assessment of Cash Flow
 - Recruitment/Training Methods
 - Integrating MSE Departments into Banks
 - Pilot Testing and Launching New Products (Express Micro Loans, Agricultural Loan)
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Take-Aways

- Intelligent project design is key to success of any downscaling project.
 - Conditions for success of downscaling:
 - Economic/Government Stability
 - Liberal financial market
 - Competitive Banking Sector (especially for lower-market)
 - Market for MSE loans not over-saturated by NGOs (which offer the same product cheaper)
 - Profit-Center Accounting should be used
 - Downscaling should be tried first
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